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Organizational Culture in the Financial Sector: Evidence from a Cross-
Industry Analysis of Employee Personal Values and Career Success 
 
Abstract 
We assess the organizational culture in the finance industry in relation to the global financial crisis (GFC) and 
consider the potential of cultural change to improve the financial sector. To avoid (response) biases, we build on the 
person-organization (P-O) fit literature and develop a novel, indirect method for assessing organizational culture that 
revolves around relationships between employees’ personal traits and their career success in the industry or 
organization under study. We analyze personal values concerning the pursuit of private gain (self-enhancement 
values) versus personal values concerning caring for others (self-transcendence values) and consider whether 
employees that value self-enhancement more and self-transcendence less enjoy more career success relative to their 
peers when working in finance than when working in other industries. Results do not reveal any sort of cross-
industry differences that would implicate the finance industry’s culture in the financial crisis. Instead, we find the 
opposite, namely that strong self-enhancement values and weak self-transcendence values go together with less 
career success in the finance industry compared to other industries. Hence, if anything, the culture in the finance 
industry does not seem to resonate well with professionals that seek to pursue personal gain at the expense of 
clients’ welfare. Implication is that cultural change has little potential to improve the financial system. Meanwhile, 
the method for assessing organizational culture indirectly by analyzing relationships between employees’ traits and 
their career outcomes has wider applicability, particularly when relying on scores or measures obtained directly 
from the people concerned is likely to render biased evidence. 
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Introduction 
With the financial sector playing a central role in the daily lives of individuals and organizations alike (Krippner, 
2005; Davis & Kim, 2015), a key question following the global financial crisis (GFC) is how the financial system 
can be improved to decrease the likelihood of future crises and optimize the intermediation between suppliers of 
credit and credit seekers. This paper assesses the finance industry’s culture in relation to the GFC and considers the 
potential of cultural change to improve the financial sector. Corporate or organizational culture, which we define 
straightforwardly as “the way we do things around here” (Bowen, 1966; Deal & Kennedy, 1982), is widely 
recognized as an essential feature of the organizational environment, having strong effects on employees and their 
behavior (Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 1992). Hence, it is only logical that the culture in the finance industry has been 
fiercely debated in the wake of the financial crisis. Professional commentators (Fox, 2010; Friedman, 2011), 
government officials (Stiglitz et al., 2010; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011) as well as academics 
(Santoro & Strauss, 2012; Werner, 2014) have been particularly concerned with the role of the finance industry’s 
culture in promoting malfeasances such as misleading customers, deliberately withholding information from clients 
and maximizing personal gain by putting the welfare of others at risk (ibidem). A study of laboratory behavior 
reports that bankers do not behave statistically significantly more dishonestly than other people do (Cohn, Fehr, & 
Maréchal, 2014) while other work finds that the values of finance professionals differ only trivially from the values 
of other people (Van Hoorn, 2015). Systematic evidence on the actual organizational culture in the finance industry 
is lacking, however, although the quasi-experimental study by Cohn et al. (2014) does report that asking bankers 
about their professional background increases their dishonesty. A particular challenge is that the widespread 
criticism that the industry’s culture has received in the wake of the crisis leads to all sorts of biases in information 
collected directly from the people concerned, professionals working in the finance industry. If we take the typical 
approach to measuring organizational culture, for instance, which is through employee questionnaires (Ashkanasy, 
Broadfoot, & Falkus, 2000), we expect substantial biases in responses collected after the start of the GFC that are 
aggravated by the fact that people’s ethical values are involved (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987; Randall & Fernandes, 
1991; Crane, 1999). On the other hand, widely discussed cases of malfeasance mostly concern specific individuals 
and their behavior—Kweku Adoboli and Jérôme Kerviel are high-profile examples (Slater, 2011)—rather than the 
actual culture of the organizations involved. Meanwhile, knowing the significance of the industry’s culture as a 
factor in the GFC is critical to the formulation of effective financial sector reforms, preventing either an under- or 
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overemphasizing of cultural change as a way to improve the current financial system (Central Bank of Ireland, 2012; 
Financial Conduct Authority, 2014). 
Seeking to present an unbiased yet systematic assessment of the finance industry’s culture in relation to the GFC, 
this paper develops an indirect method for assessing organizational culture that revolves around observing specific 
relationships between employee variables within the organization (or industry) under study. The idea, which has 
theoretical roots in the literature on person-organization (P-O) fit (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Kristof, 
1996), is simply that uncovering the personal traits that help or hamper employees achieve success in particular 
organizations is revealing of the organizational environments in these organizations, particularly their cultures. 
For the practical implementation of this indirect method for assessing organizational culture, we consider 
individuals’ personal values and their career success relative to their peers working in the same industry, notably 
their position in the corporate hierarchy. We compare the values-success relationship found for the finance industry 
with the values-success relationship found for other industries and look for cross-industry differences in this 
relationship that are consistent with the idea that the culture in the finance industry provides a better fit for 
employees willing to engage in malfeasance than other industries do. Concretely, we focus on a specific set of basic 
human values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz, 1992), namely so-called self-enhancement values (the values 
associated with power, achievement, and the pursuit of personal gain) versus so-called self-transcendence values 
(the values associated with universalism, benevolence, and caring about other people’s welfare). If the 
organizational culture in the finance industry is indeed unique and partly to blame for promoting the kind of 
malfeasances that brought down the global financial system, we expect that individuals with stronger self-
enhancement and weaker self-transcendence values will be more successful relative to their industry peers when 
working in the finance industry than when working in other industries. 
Data for our empirical analysis come from the European Social Survey or ESS (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating 
Team, 2007), which, depending on the exact sample that we consider, covers up to 211,531 individuals. In different 
waves, the ESS has collected information on the basic values of respondents but also on their occupation, as well as 
on other individual features, including the number of subordinates that an individual has. We operationalize a 
person’s career success as his/her position in the corporate hierarchy measured by this latter variable and further use 
the occupational data to distinguish between professionals working in the finance industry (FIs) and people working 
in other sectors, meaning every individual that is not working as a professional in the finance industry (non-FIs). 
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Results do not reveal any cross-industry differences consistent with the idea that the organizational culture in the 
finance industry stands out from the organizational culture in other industries in a way that implicates the finance 
industry’s culture in the GFC. In fact, we find the opposite, namely that, compared to other industries, in the finance 
industry strong self-enhancement values and weak self-transcendence values go together with less rather than more 
career success relative to one’s peers working in the same industry. Hence, if anything, the organizational culture in 
the finance industry does not seem to resonate well with professionals that seek to pursue their own personal gain at 
the expense of others. In terms of practical implications, we conclude that cultural change has only limited potential 
to address the pervasiveness of malfeasance in the finance industry. Instead, realistic and successful financial reform 
asks for the redesigning of governance structures and regulations as the factors with the most potential to bring 
favorable change to the sector. 
Overall, this paper makes two key contributions. First, and most obviously, the paper brings important insight on 
the much-debated issue of the cultural roots of the GFC and the potential of cultural change to improve the financial 
system. By presenting systematic evidence on the finance industry’s organizational culture vis-à-vis organizational 
cultures in other industries, we help clarify the significance of cultural change as part of reforms meant to improve 
the current financial system. Second, we think that in developing our indirect method for assessing the culture in the 
finance industry we also make an important methodological contribution. Although our approach is clearly not 
without limitations, we find that the specific method that we have developed for this paper is a promising addition to 
the existing toolkit for studying organizational cultures. As the approach is indirect, observing organizational culture 
in the form of patterns of variation rather than measuring it directly, the method would be particularly useful 
whenever response biases are likely to invalidate traditional approaches to culture assessment, for instance face-to-
face interviews or employee surveys. Hence, we call for more work to develop the method further, notably by 
theorizing on the set of interrelationships between employee traits and work outcomes that needs to be considered in 
order to provide a comprehensive characterization of organizations’ culture that is comparable to established 
organizational culture frameworks. 
 
Organizational Culture in the Finance Industry 
Review of Prior Research 
Though much debated, there have been few systematic studies of the organizational culture in the finance 
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industry. Two studies stand out, although as we shall explain, it is unclear what exactly these studies can tell us 
about the finance industry’s culture. 
First, Cohn et al. (2014) report on a laboratory experiment involving bankers and non-bankers with material 
incentives for dishonest behavior conducted in 2012. They find that, on average, bankers are not statistically 
significantly more prone to behaving dishonestly than people in other occupations are. However, adding a treatment 
by asking one group of bankers to make explicit statements about their professional background did have a 
statistically significant effect. Specifically, the group of bankers that was asked about their professional background 
was found to be statistically significantly more prone to dishonest behavior than the control group of bankers that 
was not asked about their professional background was. Cohn et al. (2014) attribute this effect to the culture in the 
finance industry, concluding that this culture makes employees behave more dishonest. 
Second, Van Hoorn (2015) considers the personal values of professionals in the finance industry vis-à-vis the 
personal values of the general population. To prevent biased responses, he uses survey data collected before the start 
of the GFC in 2007. Results indicate that finance professionals attach only trivially more value to power and 
achievement (self-enhancement) and only trivially less value to the welfare of others (self-transcendence) than the 
general population does. Moreover, these differences disappear completely or are overturned once standard 
individual characteristics such as level of education are added as control variables. Van Hoorn thus finds that 
malfeasances in the finance industry and the GFC would have occurred regardless of the specific individuals 
employed in the industry. 
Though interesting and important, our concern is that, in the end, these two studies do not actually speak to the 
culture in the finance industry. First, laboratory experiments involving culture such as the study by Cohn et al. 
(2014) are quasi-experimental in the sense that subjects are not randomly assigned to different organizational 
cultures, which would be required for a genuine experiment (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Matsumoto & Van 
de Vijver, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2012). Hence, it is not possible to ascertain whether any treatment effect found is 
indeed causally due to culture or due to some other factor or mechanism. Since Cohn et al. (2014) conducted their 
study in 2012, a particular concern is the possibility that the collective reputation of bankers, which has been 
severely tarnished in the wake of the crisis (Roulet, 2015), has interacted with the authors’ treatment and ended up 
biasing the results. The reason is that belonging to a group with a poor collective reputation undermines the 
incentive for individual group members to behave honestly (Tirole, 1996). Hence, we expect that asking people 
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about their finance background after the crisis increases dishonesty, but not because they were reminded about the 
culture in the finance industry, but because these bankers were less motivated to behave honestly, once their banker 
identity was brought out in the open. In fact, if collective reputation indeed accounts for the effect found by Cohn et 
al. (2014), we expect that a similar treatment effect occurs among any group of individuals that, like bankers, has a 
poor collective reputation in the eyes of the public, once their group identity has been brought out in the open. This, 
in turn, is confirmed by another laboratory study of dishonesty but involving prisoners rather than bankers (Cohn, 
Maréchal, & Noll, 2015).1 
Second, it is similarly unclear how informative the results by Van Hoorn (2015) are of the culture in the finance 
industry (rather than of the individuals working in this industry). The reason is that the culture of an organization 
comprises a whole lot more than the average of the personal values of the individual employees that work for the 
organization (Pettigrew, 1979; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 1992). Hence, while Van Hoorn (2015) effectively 
shows that the personal values of professionals in the finance industry cannot be readily blamed for the GFC 
(obvious individual wrongdoings notwithstanding; e.g., Slater, 2011), his results do not provide us with clear 
evidence on the significance of actual organizational culture in the finance industry in relation to this crisis. 
 
The Finance Industry’s Culture in the Wake of the Crisis 
From the above review, we conclude that, as is, the literature lacks clear, systematic evidence on the culture in 
the finance industry and, particularly, the significance of this culture as a factor in the GFC. Nevertheless, because 
of all the other, non-systematic information that has become available, we do have a clear idea of the specific 
features of the finance industry’s culture that we need to study in order to ascertain whether this culture may be 
blamed for the GFC and assess the potential of cultural change to improve the financial system. Specifically, 
(anecdotal) evidence on the malfeasances that happened in the sector (e.g., Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
2011; Friedman, 2011; Santoro & Strauss, 2012), raises suspicions as to whether and to what extent the industry’s 
culture has been promoting unethical behavior by individual employees. We therefore think that systematic 
assessment of the finance industry’s culture in relation to the GFC requires us to gather evidence that speaks to the 
way in which the industry has been uniquely conducive to individual employees that put the maximization of their 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, this study reports that inmates whose prisoner identity was made explicit behaved less honestly than 
the control group did, but does not attribute this result to “prison culture.” 
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personal gain above the best interests of the clients served by the industry. This idea, in turn, leads us to posit the 
following proposition as a way of summarizing the post-crisis criticism of the organizational culture in the finance 
industry: 
 
Proposition: The culture in the finance industry has been uniquely conducive to organizational members behaving 
unethically, to the extent that this culture is partly to blame for the global financial crisis. 
 
The practical implication of this proposition is that cultural change in the finance industry provides an important 
route to improving the financial system, decreasing the likelihood of future crises and optimizing the intermediation 
between suppliers of credit and credit seekers. 
How exactly we bring the above proposition to data to allow for a formal test requires some explication. Hence, 
in the next section we first elaborate on the idea of considering the relationship between employees’ personal traits 
and their career success as a method for assessing organizational culture before presenting our hypothesis. 
 
Empirical Approach and Hypothesis 
Organizational Culture, Employees’ Personal Values, and Career Success 
An indirect approach to assessing organizational culture. The most common approach to measuring 
organizational culture is through employee questionnaires where the responses to different items are combined to 
construct scores on a comprehensive set of dimensions (Ashkanasy et al., 2000). In principle, we could use the same 
approach, adding a cross-industry comparative perspective as a way of assessing whether the culture in the finance 
industry is indeed unique in a way that implicates this culture in the GFC.2 However, we deviate from this 
established approach for one simple reason, which is that we do not want to assess the culture in the finance industry 
on the basis of scores or measures obtained directly from the people concerned. Given the fierce debate on the 
culture in the finance industry that has followed the GFC, we find that the risk of biased results is simply too great 
when we allow post-crisis survey answers by finance professionals (or laboratory behaviors for that matter) to have 
                                                 
2The rationale for adding this cross-industry comparative perspective is, of course, that we can only blame the 
culture in the finance industry for the GFC if this culture is, in fact, significantly different from the culture in other 
industries. 
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direct bearing on our assessment (cf. Randall & Fernandes, 1991; Crane, 1999). Our indirect method of looking at 
cross-industry differences in the relationship between personal traits and employee outcomes, in contrast, would still 
rely on data collected from employees in the sector, but none of these data would have direct bearing on our 
assessment. Instead, the actual assessment of the culture in the industry occurs completely outside the mind of the 
people concerned, by researchers establishing relationships between different variables. Ex-post combining of data 
on employees’ personal traits with data on their work outcomes enables us to estimate the relationship between these 
two types of variables and use the pattern that emerges to make unbiased inferences about the culture of the 
industries involved. 
Obviously, the advantage of avoiding biased results comes at the expense of using a novel method that has not 
yet proven itself. However, we find that our method has a strong theoretical basis as well as much intuitive appeal. 
To start with the latter, imagine the following two organizations. In the first organization, it turns out that the most 
egotistical employees are also the ones that have the most successful careers within the organization. In the second 
organization, however, the most egotistical employees are the ones that have the least successful careers within the 
organization. Now imagine what it must be like to be an employee in one of these organizations and, especially, 
what these employees would say about their respective organizational environments. Clearly, we would expect 
rather different answers, referring to rules, routines, procedures etc. deeply embedded in these organizations. 
Accordingly, we think that it makes a lot of sense to assess the culture of organizations on the basis of the 
relationship between employees’ personal traits and the extent of their career success relative to their peers. 
Beyond this intuitive appeal, our approach has theoretical roots in the literature on the effects of P-O on 
employee outcomes (O’Reilly et al., 1991; Kristof, 1996). This literature provides ample evidence that the 
compatibility between employees’ traits such as their personality or values on the one hand and organizational 
culture on the other hand is a powerful determinant of work outcomes (Chapman et al., 2005; Kristof-Brown, 
Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005), including employees’ workplace authority (Anderson, Spataro, & Flynn, 2008). Our 
approach to assessing the organizational culture in the finance industry is rooted in this literature, specifically the 
logic that certain personality or value traits are critical to working successfully in some organizational cultures while 
these same traits hamper individuals’ ability to work successfully in other organizational cultures. Taking the 
influence of P-O fit on employee outcomes as a given, we use inter-organizational or cross-industry differences in 
the relationship between personal traits and work outcomes to make inferences about the culture of the organizations 
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or industries involved. 
An important open parameter in the design of a study that assesses organizational culture indirectly by 
comparing trait-outcome relationships is the specific traits and employee outcomes that one considers. Following the 
above example of two hypothetical organizations, we find that one of the most suitable employee outcomes to look 
at is career success relative to one’s peers working in the same organization. For sure, there are many different 
employee outcomes—as also considered by the literature on P-O fit—that could be used. However, career success 
seems a most relevant one, as career success provides a strong motivation for employees to behave in a certain way, 
including, potentially, misleading customers, deliberately withholding information from clients, and other such 
unethical behaviors. Similarly, we find that traits that speak to people’s motivations are most suitable for 
consideration, as this type of traits seems more relevant in relation to organizations’ culture than, for instance, 
experience or educational degree. Moreover, we think it more appropriate to consider broad mental orientations 
rather than narrow constructs that speak to only one specific human disposition. Concretely, we thus deem it best to 
consider employees’ personal values, which have the attractive feature that they transcend specific actions or 
situations (Schwartz, 1992).  
Meanwhile, values are rather complex constructs. Hence, before turning to the formulation of our hypothesis, 
below we first discuss exactly which values we deem appropriate for assessing organizational culture in general and 
for assessing the culture in the finance industry in relation to the GFC in particular. 
 
Values. Values are concepts about desirable end states or behavior that provide guidance to individuals in 
evaluating and choosing between alternative courses of action across a range of situations (Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1987, p. 551). Although a variety of approaches to conceptualizing values exist, the literature has been converging 
on a standard framework of universal values constructed with the aim of capturing the complete spectrum of human 
motivations. The development of this framework is mostly the work of Shalom Schwartz (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1987, Schwartz, 1992) and revolves around 10 basic values. The description of these 10 basic values is as follows 
(taken from Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 521): Power refers to social status and prestige, control or dominance over 
people and resources; Achievement refers to personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards; Hedonism refers to pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself; Stimulation refers to excitement, 
novelty, and challenge in life; Self-Direction refers to independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring; 
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Universalism refers to understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for 
nature; Benevolence refers to preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact; Tradition refers to respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional 
culture or religion provide the self; Conformity refers to restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to 
upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms; and, finally, Security refers to safety, harmony and 
stability of society, of relationships, and of self. The 10 basic values combine to form four higher-order sub-
dimensions, namely self-enhancement (Power and Achievement), self-transcendence (Benevolence and 
Universalism), openness-to-change (Self-Direction, Stimulation. and Hedonism) and conservation (Tradition, 
Conformity. and Security). Finally, the framework of universal human values comprises two overarching values 
dimensions, which combine the opposing sub-dimensions: self-transcendence versus self-enhancement and 
openness-to-change versus conservation. The opposition of sub-dimensions reflects the structure of human values, 
which is that values can be mutually compatible or incompatible. Compatibility thereby refers to the possibility of 
achieving certain values simultaneously. Power and Achievement are compatible with each other, for instance, but 
not with Universalism and Benevolence (and vice versa). 
Any of the basic values or values dimensions identified in the framework of universal human values may predict 
a person’s career success (cf. England & Lee, 1974; Watson & Williams, 1977). However, for assessing the culture 
in the finance industry in relation to the GFC, we are interested in a specific set of values, namely the basic values 
that have most direct bearing on the malfeasances that have been linked to the GFC (e.g., Stiglitz et al., 2010; 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Following Van Hoorn (2015), we find that there are four such values, 
namely Power and Achievement, which are likely to capture motivations that make individuals more prone to 
malfeasance, and Benevolence and Universalism, which are likely to capture motivations that make individuals less 
prone to malfeasance. However, as these four basic values combine into the sub-dimensions of self-enhancement 
(SE) and self-transcendence (ST) as well as the overarching self-transcendence versus self-enhancement (ST/SE) 
dimension, in our empirical analysis we focus on these latter three value constructs. 
 
Hypothesis 
Our hypothesis derives directly from the proposition that the culture in the finance industry stands out from the 
culture in other industries in a way that implicates this culture in the GFC. Comparing the values-success 
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relationship in the finance industry with the values-success relationship in other industries allows us to check 
whether these two relationships differ in a way that is consistent with the idea that the finance industry’s culture 
promotes malfeasance more than organizational cultures elsewhere do. Following our proposition on the culture in 
the finance industry, specifically this culture’s effect on malfeasances and employees putting the maximization of 
own personal gain above the interests of the clients that they serve, we expect that individuals with strong ST values 
/ weak SE values will have a hard time working in this industry. Individuals with strong SE values / weak ST values, 
on the other hand, will thrive in this industry. More concretely, and taking in the literature that relates P-O fit to 
employee outcomes, we posit that individuals with strong SE values have a better fit with the finance industry and 
therefore enjoy more career success in this industry than individuals with weak SE values do. And, similarly, we 
expect that individuals with strong ST values have a poorer fit with the finance industry and therefore enjoy less 
career success in this industry than individuals with weak ST values do. Moreover, we posit that the finance industry 
is, overall, much more appreciative of strong SE values and much more dismissive of strong ST values than other 
industries are. Hence, we translate the proposition presented in the previous section into the following hypothesis 
(H1): 
 
Hypothesis 1: Career success in the finance industry correlates more positively with the strength of people’s self-
enhancement values and more negatively with the strength of people’s self-transcendence values than career success 
in other industries does. 
 
We test this hypothesis below. First, however, we discuss our sample and measures and details of our statistical 
method, specifically the empirical models that we estimate to test these hypothesis. 
 
Sample, Measures, and Statistical Method 
Sample 
Our data come from the first six waves of the European Social Survey or ESS (Jowell and Central Co-ordinating 
Team, 2007). The ESS is a bi-annual survey of nationally representative samples of mostly European countries. The 
survey started in 2002 so that we have data collected in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. For our baseline 
analysis we use data collected in all these years. However, as a robustness check we also consider data collected 
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before the start of the GFC only, meaning data collected between 2002 and 2006. The countries in our main sample 
are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine (32 in total). 
The data collected by the ESS varies from measures of respondents’ basic values to a variety of demographic 
variables and other background characteristics, including respondents’ occupation and the number of subordinates 
that they have, if any. Our sample comprises all individuals with non-missing data on the relevant variables. 
Depending on choices regarding the time of data collection (see above) and the variables considered, the sample for 
the empirical analysis can cover up to 211,531 individuals (our main sample). The ESS is the source for all our data, 
both the dependent and the independent variables in our estimating equation. Note, though, that common method 
bias is not a problem, as our interest is not so much in explaining differences in absolute levels of a variable, but in 
comparing relationships between variables across different groups, specifically professionals working in finance 
(FIs) vis-à-vis people working in other industries (non-FIs). Additionally, common method bias would be most 
problematic when both the dependent and independent variables in the analysis concern subjective assessments, 
which is typically not the case in our analysis. More information on the ESS and the variables included in this 
survey is available from its website, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
 
Measures 
Classification of professionals working in the finance industry. The dependent variable in our empirical 
analysis concerns individuals’ career success. Similarly, the main independent variable in our analysis concerns 
individuals’ personal values. Nevertheless, the key variable in our analysis is the measure that we use to identify 
respondents as working in the finance industry (FI) or not (non-FI). We follow Van Hoorn (2015) and create a 
dummy variable to classify individuals as FI (score of 1) or not (score of 0) on the basis of four-digit occupational 
codes from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The first five waves of the ESS (2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010) classify people’s occupation on the basis of the 1988 ISCO classification (ISCO88), 
which is also used by Van Hoorn (2015). In the 1988 classification, the occupational categories that we classify as 
FIs are: Finance and sales associate professionals (ISCO88 3410); Securities and finance dealers and brokers 
(ISCO88 3411); Business services agents and trade brokers (ISCO88 3420); and Trade brokers (ISCO88 3421). For 
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Wave 6, the ESS switched to the 2008 ISCO classification (ISCO08). In this classification, the occupational 
categories that we classify as FIs are: Financial and investment advisers (ISCO08 2412) and Securities and finance 
dealers and brokers (ISCO08 3311). Throughout, our identification criterion is strict in the sense of only 
considering professionals in the finance industry and not support staff or other types of employees, as these are not 
the kind of employees whose behavior has been blamed for the GFC. 
Overall, we have almost 800 individuals classified as FI in our analysis, where the exact number depends on the 
sample chosen and the other variables (e.g., control variables) included in the analysis. However, for one of our 
robustness checks we also consider a more narrow classification of FIs, for which we re-classify Finance and sales 
associate professionals (ISCO88 3410) and Business services agents and trade brokers (ISCO88 3420) as non-FIs. In 
this case, we have almost 450 individuals classified as FIs in our analysis. More information on the ISCO88 and 
ISCO08 classification can be found on the website of the ESS that we mentioned earlier and, particularly, the 
website of the International Labour Organisation, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco. 
 
Dependent variable: Employee career success. The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the success 
that an individual is able to achieve in his/her professional career. Of course, career success can be defined and 
operationalized in a variety of ways and, at any rate, is a highly subjective concept. We measure an individual’s 
career success by the number of subordinates that he or she has, if any. This measure derives from the item included 
in the ESS that asks respondents how many people they are/were responsible for in their job. In case the respondent 
is not responsible for supervising the work of other employees, the number of subordinates equals 0. Because this 
specific measure is left-censored, we apply a simple logarithmic transformation. However, because we cannot take 
the log of 0, we first add 1 to the number of subordinates that the respondents has and then take the natural logarithm 
of the resulting sum. 
To assess the robustness of our results we also consider two alternative indicators of an individuals’ career 
success. The first of these concerns the amount of authority that the respondent has at his/her place of work. We 
construct this measure as the principal component of two items in the ESS asking respondents about the autonomy 
and the influence that they have at their job. The first item reads as follows: “please say how much the management 
at your work allows/allowed you to decide how your own daily work is/was organised?” where answers can range 
from 0, I have/had no influence to 10, I have/had complete control. The second item similarly reads: “please say 
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how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to influence policy decisions about the activities of the 
organisation?” where answers can also range from 0, I have/had no influence to 10, I have/had complete control. 
Both these items have been used in studies of the quality of jobs and workplace practices (e.g., Esser & Olsen, 
2012). More generally, these items tap into the core features of a job as identified in the literature on job design and 
job characteristics (Hackman & Oldham, 1975). Cronbach’s alpha for the combination of these two measures equals 
0.783, which signals more than adequate internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
For our second alternative measure of career success, we seek to take into account that one’s position in the 
corporate hierarchy is not only a function of the absolute number of subordinates that one has but also the number of 
subordinates relative to the total size of the organization for which one works. The ESS asks respondents about the 
size of the organization they work for using the following item: “Including yourself, about how many people 
are/were employed at the place where you usually work/worked.” There are five possible answer categories: (i) 
Under 10; (ii) 10 to 24; (iii) 25 to 99; (iv) 100 to 499; and (v) 500 or more. Since organization size is measured on a 
cardinal scale, we deem it unwise to simply divide the number of subordinates by the size of the organization to 
construct our second alternative measure of professional career success. Instead, we first convert both the number of 
subordinates measure and the organization size measure into percentile scores, before taking their division. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for all three measures of employee career success that we consider, both for the sample 
as a whole and for the subsamples of FIs only. 
 
Main independent variables: Self-enhancement and self-transcendence values. As indicated, the personal 
values that we consider derive from the standard framework of universal human values. We operationalize the basic 
values and higher-order dimensions in this framework using the 21-item Portrait Values Questionnaire or PVQ 
(Schwartz et al., 2001). The term “portrait” thereby refers to the specific way in which the PVQ elicits values from 
respondents, namely by asking respondents to describe themselves in comparison to a portrait presented to them by 
the interviewer. Answers are given on a Likert-type scale, allowing respondents to indicate how much the described 
person is like them (1, Very much like me – 6, Not like me at all). Follow the standard recoding protocol for the 
PVQ, we ipsatize ratings on the separate items of the PVQ by subtracting the average score of the respondent on all 
the items included in the PVQ. The reason is that the framework of universal human values finds that values have a 
relative priority, meaning that values are only important or unimportant relative to other values. Hence, an individual 
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may indicate that he/she finds money and material possessions unimportant but may attach even less importance to 
the well-being of friends. To calculate SE and ST values we subsequently first calculate the underlying basic values, 
Power and Achievement (SE values) and Benevolence and Universalism (ST values).3 Finally, we calculate ST/SE 
scores by subtracting an individual’s SE score from his/her ST score. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the 
resulting measures. 
As stated, the reason for considering the SE and ST values from the framework of universal human values (and 
not other basic values) is that these specific values have a clear conceptual match with the kind of malfeasances that 
have come to be associated with the GFC (cf. Van Hoorn, 2015). This conceptual match has an empirical 
counterpart, however, as there is ample evidence demonstrating a link between individuals’ SE and ST values and 
such concrete behaviors as sharing and helping as well as delinquency and shoplifting (see Schwartz, 2009 for a 
survey). Still, though, a possible critique of the personal values that we consider is that such broad dispositional 
measures are, in fact, rather far removed from the concrete malfeasances that have come to be associated with the 
finance industry in general and the GFC in particular. Hence, as a robustness check, we also conduct our main 
empirical analysis replacing our values measures with two behavioral measures. These two alternative measures 
derive from items included in the 2004 wave of the ESS that ask individuals how often they have engaged in a 
particular type of dishonest behavior during the last 5 years, namely (i) made an exaggerated or false insurance 
claim or (ii) paid cash without a receipt to avoid some tax. Answers can range from 1, Never to 5, Five or more 
times so that a higher score indicates more dishonesty.4 Table 1 again presents descriptive statistics. As the data on 
insurance fraud and tax fraud have only been collected in 2004, our sample is much smaller when considering these 
measures than when considering individuals’ basic values. 
 
Control variables. To check the robustness of some of our results and to extend our main analysis, we typically 
                                                 
3
 The exact wording of the nine portraits used to measure these values is available on request. 
4
 We have also calculated the correlations between the measures of insurance fraud and tax fraud and the basic 
values from the framework of universal human values. These correlations equal -0.03 and -0.05 for ST values, 0.05 
and 0.08 for SE values, and -0.05 and -0.08 for ST/SE values (p-values equal 0.00 in all cases; n = 42,437 for 
insurance fraud and n = 41,691 for tax fraud), providing further support for considering these specific values in our 
analysis. 
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control for various traits of individuals other than their values. These variables concern some standard demographics 
as well as other personal traits that may play a role in the workplace. To start with the former, we consider both 
individuals’ sex (1 = male) and age. We calculate age by combining the year of data collection with the answer on 
the ESS questionnaire item asking respondents about their year of birth. When adding control variables we include a 
linear and a quadratic age term. Education is a first of the other personal traits that we consider. When adding 
educational controls we add both a set of dummy variables to indicate level of education (completed elementary 
education, incomplete secondary education, etc.; eight categories in total) and a continuous measure of the years of 
education that the individual has. We further take into account differences in working hours, finding that the amount 
of time that someone invests in his/her job likely correlates with both career success and personal values. Finally, we 
control for the nature of the individual’s employment relation, notably whether someone is self-employed or not, 
and country fixed effects. For both these factors, we construct a set of dummy variables, selecting one category as 
the reference category. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
To save space, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for a selected set of control variables only. Descriptive 
statistics for the non-reported control variables are available on request. 
 
Statistical Method 
To test our hypothesis, we use regression analysis. The dependent variable is the career success of individual i, 
which we denote by Si. Similarly, the main independent variable in our analysis concerns the personal values of the 
individual, which we denote by Vi. Chief feature of H1 is that it involves a comparison between career success in the 
finance industry and career success in other industries. We incorporate this feature in our empirical model through 
an interaction term that allows the relationship between people’s values and career success to vary across industries, 
specifically the finance industry vis-à-vis all other industries. The resulting model is given by: 
 
ii4i3ii2i1oi εXβFIβ)FI(VβVββS +++×++= ,       (1) 
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where FIi refers to the dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a professional working in the finance 
industry or not. Although this empirical model incorporates a direct effect of people’s values on career, the most 
important term is the interaction term involving individuals’ industry of employment and their personal values. 
Obviously, the model also controls for the direct effect of being employed in the finance industry. Practically, Eq. 1 
thus provides a model for predicting individuals’ career success relative to peers active in the same industry. H1 is 
confirmed when β2 is statistically significantly negative for ST and ST/SE values and statistically significantly 
positive for SE values. In that case, the finance industry appears more appreciative of values directed towards 
personal gain (self-enhancement) and less appreciative of values directed towards the well-being of others (self-
transcendence) than other industries are (and vice versa in case β2 is statistically significantly positive for ST and 
ST/SE values and statistically significantly negative for SE values). Similarly, when using our two alternatives to 
personal values, the measures of insurance fraud and of tax fraud respectively, H1 is confirmed when β2 is 
statistically significantly positive. 
To be sure, our statistical method, as well as the fact that we consider individuals’ career success as the 
dependent variable, appears sensitive to selection issues. Because of classic attraction, selection and attrition effects 
(e.g., Schneider, 1987), at any point in time, the group of people (not) working in the finance industry is not a 
random sample but comprises people that are, to a certain extent, selected into this industry (or the other industries) 
on purpose. In fact, following the importance of P-O fit for employee outcomes, people are partly attracted to a 
particular industry because their personal value traits have a good match with the organizational culture in this 
industry. As a consequence, a bias would occur if we were to compare the career success of FIs with a certain set of 
values with the career success of non-FIs with the same set of values. However, this is not what we actually do in 
our analysis, as the comparison that we draw is between the career success of individuals with different sets of 
values that are all working in the same industry, meaning individuals that have underwent the same process of 
attraction, selection and attrition. Meanwhile, we have also formally tested whether the model that determines 
whether someone is an FI or not is independent of the model that determines someone’s career success (Heckman, 
1979), finding that we could not reject the null hypothesis of independence at usual levels of statistical significance. 
 
Empirical Results 
Baseline Results 
 19
To start, we first estimate the simple relationship between individuals’ personal values and the number of 
subordinates that they have, also adding an interaction term involving the industry in which the individual is 
employed (FI versus non-FI) (Models 1-3 in Table 2). Results show that scoring higher on self-transcendence (ST) 
and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement (ST/SE) values is associated with having fewer subordinates, on 
average, while this association is positive for self-enhancement (SE) values. As we would expect, these correlations 
remain when adding the interaction terms that allow the size and the sign of these correlations to differ between the 
finance industry and other industries (Models 4-6 in Table 2). 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
More importantly, the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms (Models 4-6) consistently indicate that 
people with stronger SE values and weaker ST values do not enjoy more career success relative to their industry 
peers when they are working in the finance industry than when they are working in other industries. Hence, the 
results do not support H1 and, in fact, almost the opposite pattern than the pattern predicted by H1 holds. Scoring 
higher on ST or ST/SE values has a statistically significantly less (p < 0.1) negative effect on the number of 
subordinates that someone has when working in the finance industry than when working in other industries (Models 
4 and 5). Similarly, having stronger SE values has a less positive effect on career success in the finance industry 
than in other industries, although in this case the difference, as measured by the coefficient for the interaction term, 
is not statistically significant at usual levels (p = 0.15) (Model 6). In terms of effect size, the coefficients for the 
interaction terms are typically strong enough to overturn a positive or negative direct effect of a set of personal 
values on individuals’ career success. As an example, while ST/SE values have a negative effect on career success 
relative to one’s industry peers, the net effect in the finance industry is positive (-0.02 + 0.06 ≈ 0.04) (Model 4). 
More generally, effect sizes tend to be small, as expressed in small standardized coefficients and low variance 
explained. 
 
Robustness Checks 
As indicated in the previous section, we apply different tests to assess the robust of our baseline findings (Tables 3-
6). 
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Controlling for possible confounders. A most prominent limitation of the analyses presented in Table 2 is the 
possibility of an omitted variable bias. Specifically, a third variable may be correlated with both individuals’ values 
and the likelihood that an individual works in the finance industry, for instance his/her level of education. If this is 
the case, there will be a bias in the coefficient for the interaction term that allows us to assess the culture in the 
finance industry vis-à-vis the culture in other industries. To deal with this issue, we estimate our main empirical 
models (Models 4-6), adding a variety of control variables, including, not least, years of education and total hours 
worked. Table 3 presents the results, where we again estimate separate models for ST/SE, ST and SE values 
(Models 7-9). 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Most relevant finding is that results again do not support H1. In fact, in all three cases, the sign of the coefficient 
for the interaction term is counter to H1. Moreover, in two out of three cases (Models 7 and 9) this coefficient not 
only has the wrong sign but is statistically significant at usual levels as well (p < 0.1). Meanwhile, we prefer the 
empirical model specification that includes control variables (Models 7-9) over the model specification that does not 
include control variables (Models 4-6), as the former specification allows for an analysis of the relationship between 
people’s personal values and their career success that is unbiased by confounders. For the remainder of our analyses 
we therefore always include control variables. 
 
Behavioral measures instead of values. A second limitation of our baseline analysis to deal with is that the SE 
and ST values that we consider really do not match the kind of malfeasances associated with the finance industry in 
general and the GFC in particular. However, replacing our values measures with behavioral measures concerning 
dishonest behavior, specifically insurance fraud or tax fraud, does not change the results (Models 10-11 in Table 3). 
Individuals that have committed insurance or tax fraud more often during the past 5 years enjoy less rather than 
more relative career success in the finance industry compared to other industries, although the difference is not 
statistically significant at usual levels. 
 
Alternative measures of individuals’ career success. While the number of subordinates that a person has is the 
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main dependent variable in our analysis, we also want to make sure that this specific operationalization of 
individuals’ career success is not somehow affecting our results. To assess the robustness of our baseline results for 
the specific operationalization chosen, we repeat our estimation of our preferred empirical models, meaning the 
empirical models that include control variables (Models 7-9 in Table 3). 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Results are again robust (Table 4). Specifically, coefficients for the interaction terms are never both statistically 
significant and of the sign predicted by H1. In fact, there are only two cases out of six (Models 15 and 16) in which 
there is a statistically significant difference between the finance industry and other industries in the relationship 
between personal values and career success (p < 0.1). However, in both these cases the sign is in the direction 
opposite to the direction predicted by H1, thus providing statistically significant evidence counter to this hypothesis. 
 
Potential biases resulting from including post-crisis data. Since some of the data that we use have been 
collected after the start of the GFC in 2007, there is the potential that answers are biased by the intense, post-crisis 
debate on the finance industry’s culture. We do not immediately see how this would cause a problem for the present 
analysis, given the indirect approach to assessing organizational culture that we employ. However, as indicated, we 
also check the robustness of our findings using a sample comprising only data collected before the start of the crisis. 
As expected, results are largely the same as before (Models 18-20 in Table 5). The main difference is that we do not 
find statistically significant evidence counter to H1 as we did before, which is likely the result of having fewer FIs in 
the sample than before (380 versus 797 for Models 7-9). Still, though, we do not find any evidence whatsoever 
supporting H1 either. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
 
A different classification of professionals in the finance industry. As a last robustness check, we apply a 
stricter criterion for classifying individuals as professionals working in the finance industry. Applying this stricter 
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criterion reduces the total number of FIs in our sample from 797 (Tables 2 and 3) to 446. Also in this case, however, 
results are largely unaffected (Models 21-23 in Table 5). Notably, the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms 
still go against H1, though they lack statistical significance at usual levels. 
 
Extension: Comparative Results for Selected Other Industries 
So far, our analysis has considered the finance industry vis-à-vis all other industries. However, to get a better 
sense of how exactly industries may differ in terms of the observed relationship between people’s personal values 
and their career success, it is helpful to consider some other industries in detail as well. We have selected two such 
industries that fit with prior stereotypes as to the kind of organizational culture that they might have, highly 
appreciative of ST values and highly dismissive of SE values and the other way around. The first industry concerns 
nursing and midwifery, which we expect to have an organizational culture that resonates better with individuals with 
strong ST values and weak SE values. Similarly, the second industry involves professionals working as retail or 
wholesale trade managers, which we expect to have an organizational culture that resonates better with individuals 
with strong SE values and weak ST values.5 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Consistent with our stereotypical characterization of the two industries, results (Table 6) indicate that individuals 
with strong ST values / weak SE values enjoy statistically significant more career success relative to their peers in 
the nursing/midwifery industry vis-à-vis other industries, while individuals with strong SE values / weak ST values 
enjoy more career success relative to their peers working in retail or wholesale trade than when working in other 
industries. A most interesting finding is that, overall, inter-industry differences found are much more pronounced 
than the inter-industry differences found when comparing the finance industry with other industries. For nursing and 
                                                 
5
 The group of Nursing or midwifery professionals comprises four ISCO categories: Nursing and midwifery 
professionals (ISCO88 2230); Nursing and midwifery professionals (ISCO08 2220); Nursing professionals (ISCO08 
2221); and Midwifery professionals (ISCO08 2222). The group of Retail or wholesale trade managers comprises two 
ISCO categories: Managers in wholesale and retail trade (ISCO88 1224); and Retail and wholesale trade managers 
(ISCO08 1420). 
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midwifery professionals, for instance, we find a coefficient for the interaction term involving ST values of 0.08 
(Model 25 in Table 6), which is more than 50% larger than the coefficient of 0.05 that we found for professionals in 
the finance industry (Model 8 in Table 3). Moreover, whereas SE values had a more negative effect on career 
success in the finance industry than in other industries (Model 9 in Table 3), SE values have a more positive effect 
on career success in retail or wholesale trade than in other industries (Model 29 in Table 6).6 Most important finding 
of the above exercise, however, is that our indirect method for assessing organizational culture appears quite able to 
pick up important differences in the organizational culture in different industries. 
 
Discussion 
Overall, our results do not reveal any evidence that supports the proposition that the culture in the finance 
industry is unique in a way that implicates this culture in the GFC. While the idea that the culture in the finance 
industry is partly to blame for the GFC has been hugely popular and larded with anecdotes (e.g., Fox, 2010; 
Friedman, 2011), our results present no indication whatsoever that the industry’s culture indeed stands out from the 
culture in other industries in terms of fostering malfeasances. We have empirically assessed whether the culture in 
the finance industry deviates significantly from other industries in the sense that employees need to have strong self-
enhancement values and weak self-transcendence values in order to be successful in this industry. Results, however, 
unambiguously indicate that this is not the case. Instead, the opposite appears to hold, which is that strong self-
enhancement (Power and Achievement) values and weak self-transcendence (Benevolence and Universalism) values 
go together with less relative career success in the finance industry compared to other industries. 
Clearly, the indirect method for assessing organizational culture that we have used, comparing the values-success 
relationship found for the finance industry with the values-success relationship found for other industries, can be a 
limiting factor. Notably, results might depend on the particular relationships and measures that we have considered 
in the empirical analysis. However, extensive checks indicate that our results are robust to using a range of 
                                                 
6
 To be complete, the coefficient for this last effect lacks statistical significance at usual levels (p = 0.11), even 
though the absolute size of the coefficient in Model 29 (0.06) is larger than the absolute size of the coefficient in 
Model 9 (0.05). Explanation for the lower statistical significance despite a larger effect size is that the number of 
retail or wholesale trade managers is lower than the number of professionals working in the finance industry, 636 
versus 797. 
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alternative operationalizations and measures of our key dependent and independent variables, not least various 
alternatives by which to measure individuals’ career success. Hence, the conclusion following our empirical analysis 
is simply that, since the culture in the finance industry does not resonate well with professionals that seek to pursue 
their own personal gain at the expense of others, the finance industry’s culture cannot be blamed for the GFC. 
 
Conclusion 
Given that finance plays a central role in the daily lives of individuals and organizations alike, a fundamental 
question following the global financial crisis (GFC) is how the financial system can be improved to decrease the 
likelihood of future crises and optimize the intermediation between suppliers of credit and credit seekers. A factor 
often highlighted as one of the chief culprits in the GFC is the culture in the finance industry, which is said to have 
fostered the widespread malfeasances that brought down the financial system. This paper has provided a systematic 
assessment of the finance industry’s culture in relation to the GFC. 
In the wake of the GFC, the culture in the finance industry has been fiercely debated. A main challenge for our 
study has therefore been that quasi-experiments or survey measures cannot be readily used, as being subject of 
intense criticism is likely to bias people’s behavior in such experiments or their answers to culture-related survey 
questions. We have sought to overcome this challenge by developing a novel method for assessing the culture of an 
organization (or in an industry) that does not consider culture directly but focuses on the relationship between 
employees’ personal traits and their career success in the organization (or industry) under study. With theoretical 
roots in the large literature on the effects of P-O fit on employee outcomes, the idea behind this method is that we 
can infer a great deal about the culture of an organization by simply observing which personal traits help or hamper 
individual employees to be successful in this organization. The actual assessment of organizational culture 
subsequently does not revolve around measures or scores collected directly from the people concerned, as is typical 
in the literature (e.g., through employee surveys), but around inter-organizational (or cross-industry) variation in the 
relationship between personal traits and employee outcomes. 
We applied this method to test the proposition that the culture in the finance industry is partly to blame for the 
GFC because it has been uniquely conducive to organizational members behaving unethically. Results subsequently 
revealed systematic differences between the finance industry and other industries in terms of the extent to which 
employees’ so-called self-enhancement values (i.e., values emphasizing the pursuit of private gain) and so-called 
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self-transcendence values (i.e., values emphasizing caring for others) are associated with career success relative to 
one’s industry peers. However, in all cases, the finance industry appeared less appreciative of self-enhancement and 
more appreciative of self-transcendence than other industries are. Hence, we did not find any sort of cross-industry 
differences that would implicate the finance industry’s culture in the GFC. 
Based on these findings, we conclude that the organizational culture in the finance industry has not been a 
significant factor in the GFC. This conclusion, in turn, has important implications for reforms meant to improve the 
current financial system. The GFC has helped uncover important weaknesses of the financial system that make the 
system vulnerable to crises and undermine its ability to provide efficient intermediation between suppliers of credit 
and organizations and individuals seeking credit. Accordingly, and given the sector’s real-life importance, 
improving the financial system is high on political agenda’s worldwide. Following the debate highlighting the 
finance industry’s culture as one of the chief culprits in the GFC, many pundits have thereby proposed cultural 
change as key to improving the financial system. Our results, in contrast, indicate that cultural change has only 
limited potential to improve the financial system. Because the culture in the finance industry does not stand out from 
the culture in other industries, it is not realistic to expect that changing the industry’s culture would somehow lead to 
a drastic reduction in malfeasance by employees working in the sector. Instead, it makes more sense for financial 
reforms to target formal governance structures and regulations in the industry, as these apparently leave a lot of 
room for dishonesty and unethical behavior more broadly. Our analysis thus contributes an important practical 
insight, which is that attention should shift away from cultural change towards other types of financial sector 
reforms that promise to be much more potent in improving the financial system. 
A second contribution of this paper comes in the form of the method for assessing organizational culture that we 
have developed. Focusing on relationships between employees’ personal traits and their career success in the 
industry or organization under study, this method differs substantially from traditional approaches to measuring 
organizational culture. This difference, in turn, has both advantages and disadvantages. The method’s most notable 
advantages are its wide applicability—all that is required are data on personal traits and work outcomes—and the 
fact that it is indirect, which provides shielding from different types of (response) biases. A first, practical 
disadvantage is that the method is data intensive, requiring detailed information on both personal traits and work 
outcomes for a large group of employees. A second, conceptual disadvantage is that our method does not clearly 
delineate what exactly it is about industries or organizations that is driving observed differences in the relationship 
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between employees’ personal traits and their career success. We have taken these differences as reflecting 
differences in organizational culture. However, strictly speaking, these differences could also be reflecting 
differences in, for instance, organizational climate. For the purpose of this paper, nothing is lost by not explicitly 
distinguishing between culture and climate as both are concerned with describing organizational environments and, 
at any rate, are strongly related (Denison, 1996). Nevertheless, future research may work on thinking about how 
conceptually distinct elements of organizational environments may get expressed in relationships between different 
sets of personal traits and employee outcomes. More generally, we think that our indirect approach to assessing 
organizational culture needs further development before it can realize its full potential as a valuable addition to the 
existing toolkit for studying organizational cultures, especially when other methods are likely to elicit biased 
information from the employees concerned. A particularly interesting and important topic for future research is to 
theorize on the set of interrelationships between employee traits and outcomes that can be combined as a way of 
providing a comprehensive characterization of organizations’ culture (or climate for that matter). Extant frameworks 
of organizational culture have identified a variety of different dimensions of organizational culture and it would be 
interesting to relate features of organizations’ culture expressed in trait-outcome relationships to the cultural 
dimensions identified in such earlier work. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Whole sample Finance industry professionals Finance industry professionals, 
narrow classification 
 
Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD 
 
Finance industry professional (0/1) 
 
.38% 213,283 6.14% 
      
Finance industry professional, narrow 
classification (0/1) .21% 213,283 4.59%       
 
Number of subordinates 
 
6.57 211,531 99.6 3.93 797 14.5 3.38 446 13.8 
 
Authority (principal component) 
 
0 182,553 1 .38 674 .85 .38 376 .87 
 
Position in corporate hierarchy 
 
1.53 206,174 1.35 1.64 783 1.38 1.62 435 1.33 
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement 
(ST/SE) values 1.27 213,283 1.11 1.08 806 1.10 1.01 450 1.15 
 
Self-transcendence (ST) values 
 
.63 213,283 .52 .58 806 .50 .53 450 .52 
 
Self-enhancement (SE) values 
 
-.64 213,283 .73 -.50 806 .73 -.47 450 .76 
 
Years of education 
 
12.5 213,283 3.97 14.1 806 3.48 14.4 450 3.34 
 
Total hours normally worked per week 
 
40.4 213,283 13.9 40.8 806 12.4 40.5 450 12.2 
 
Data collected before start of crisis (0/1) 
 
43.7% 213,283 49.6% 47.8% 806 50.0% 38.4% 450 48.7% 
Paid cash with no receipt to avoid tax (1, never – 
5, five or more times) 1.86 33,170 1.51 1.83 146 1.40 1.81 63 1.27 
Made exaggerated or false insurance claim (1, 
never – 5, five or more times) 1.33 33,712 1.19 1.34 146 1.16 1.14 63 .67 
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Table 2 Which Industry’s Culture Fits Better with Strong self-enhancement and Weak self-transcendence Values? 
Dependent variable = Number of subordinates that 
respondent has Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values 
(ST/SE) 
-.02*** 
(.00) - - 
-.02*** 
(.00) - - 
Self-transcendence values (ST) - .00 (.00) - - 
.003 
(.002) - 
Self-enhancement values (SE) - - .03*** (.00) - - 
.03*** 
(.00) 
ST/SE values × Finance industry (0/1) - - - .06* (.04) - - 
ST values × Finance industry (0/1) - - - - .07* (.04) - 
SE values × Finance industry (0/1) - - - - - -.05 (.04) 
Finance industry (0/1) .07* (.04) 
.07** 
(.04) 
.07* 
(.04) 
.08** 
(.04) 
.08** 
(.04) 
.08** 
(.04) 
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 797 797 797 797 797 797 
Total sample size 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 
R2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Notes: As described in the main text, the dependent variable is log-transformed by adding 1 to the number of subordinates and taking the natural logarithm of the 
resulting sum. A minus sign for the coefficient implies that the respondent has fewer subordinates. Continuous (non-dummy) variables (both dependent and 
independent) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 3 Robustness Check: Control Variables Added and Replacing Dispositional Measures with Behavioral 
Measures 
Dependent variable = Number of 
subordinates that respondent has 
   
Behavioral measures 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Self-transcendence versus self-
enhancement values (ST/SE) 
-.04*** 
(.00) - - - - 
Self-transcendence values (ST) - -.02*** (.00) - - - 
Self-enhancement values (SE) - - .04*** (.00) - - 
ST/SE values × Finance industry (0/1) .06* (.03) - - - - 
ST values × Finance industry (0/1) - .05 (.03) - - - 
SE values × Finance industry (0/1) - - -.05* (.03) - - 
Insurance fraud - - - .01* (.01) - 
Insurance fraud × Finance industry 
(0/1) - - - 
-.01 
(.06) - 
Tax fraud - - - - .03*** (.01) 
Tax fraud × Finance industry (0/1) - - - - -.07 (.08) 
Finance industry (0/1) -.05 (.03) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.03) 
.15* 
(.08) 
.14* 
(.08) 
Years of education .15*** (.00) 
.15*** 
(.00) 
.15*** 
(.00) 
.19*** 
(.01) 
.19*** 
(.01) 
Total hours worked per week .17*** (.00) 
.17*** 
(.00) 
.17*** 
(.00) 
.16*** 
(.01) 
.16*** 
(.01) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of finance industry professionals in 
sample 797 797 797 137 140 
Total sample size 211,531 211,531 211,531 31,427 30,994 
R2 .14 .14 .14 .14 .14 
Notes: See Table 2. The complete set of control variables is age, age squared, sex (dummy variable), educational 
degree (dummy variables), years of education (see table), total hours worked per week (see table), type of 
employment relation (dummy variables), and a complete set of country dummies. 
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Table 4 Results for Two Alternative Measures of Individuals’ Career Success 
 
Dependent variable = Level of authority that 
respondent has 
Dependent variable = Position in the corporate 
hierarchy 
 
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values 
(ST/SE) 
-.02*** 
(.00) - - 
-.02*** 
(.00) - - 
Self-transcendence values (ST) - -.02*** (.00) - - 
-.02*** 
(.00) - 
Self-enhancement values (SE) - - .02*** (.00) - - 
.01*** 
(.00) 
ST/SE values × Finance industry (0/1) .00 (.03) - - 
.071** 
(.03) - - 
ST values × Finance industry (0/1) - -.01 (.03) - - 
.05 
(.03) - 
SE values × Finance industry (0/1) - - -.01 (.03) - - 
-.07** 
(.03) 
Finance industry (0/1) .15*** (.03) 
.15*** 
(.03) 
.15*** 
(.03) 
.01 
(.03) 
.00 
(.03) 
.01 
(.03) 
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 674 674 674 783 783 783 
Total sample size 182,553 182,553 182,553 206,174 206,174 206,174 
R2 .34 .34 .34 .17 .17 .17 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 5 Robustness Checks Using Pre-Crisis Data and a More Narrow Classification of Finance Professionals 
Dependent variable = Number of subordinates that 
respondent has 
Pre-crisis data More narrow classification of Finance industry professionals 
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values 
(ST/SE) 
-.05*** 
(.003) - - 
-.04*** 
(.00) - - 
Self-transcendence values (ST) - -.03*** (.00) - - 
-.02*** 
(.00) - 
Self-enhancement values (SE) - - .05*** (.00) - - 
.04*** 
(.00) 
ST/SE values × Finance industry (0/1) .02 (.050) - - 
.05 
(.04) - - 
ST values × Finance industry (0/1) - .06 (.05) - - 
.03 
(.05) - 
SE values × Finance industry (0/1) - - .01 (.05) - - 
-.05 
(.04) 
Finance industry (0/1) .02 (.05) 
.02 
(.05) 
.01 
(.05) 
-.13*** 
(.05) 
-.13*** 
(.04) 
-.13*** 
(.04) 
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 380 380 380 446 446 446 
Total sample size 92,249 92,249 92,249 211,531 211,531 211,531 
R2 .15 .15 .15 .14 .14 .14 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 6 A Comparative Perspective: Results for Two Other Industries 
Dependent variable = Number of subordinates 
that respondent has 
Nursing or midwifery professionals Retail or wholesale trade managers 
Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement 
values (ST/SE) 
-.04*** 
(.00) - - 
-.04*** 
(.00) - - 
Self-transcendence values (ST) - -.02*** (.00) - - 
-.02*** 
(.00) - 
Self-enhancement values (SE) - - .04*** (.00) - - 
.04*** 
(.00) 
ST/SE values × Nursing or midwifery 
professional (0/1) 
.08*** 
(.02) - - - - - 
ST values × Nursing or midwifery professional 
(0/1) - 
.08*** 
(.02) - - - - 
SE values × Nursing or midwifery professional 
(0/1) - - 
-.06** 
(.02) - - - 
ST/SE values × Retail or wholesale trade (0/1) - - - -.06 (.04) - - 
ST values × Retail or wholesale trade (0/1) - - - - -.04 (.04) - 
SE values × Retail or wholesale trade (0/1) - - - - - .06 (.04) 
Nursing or midwifery professional (0/1) .30*** (.02) 
.29*** 
(.02) 
.31 
(.02) - - - 
Retail or wholesale trade (0/1) - - - 1.18*** (.04) 
1.19*** 
(.04) 
1.19*** 
(.04) 
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of professionals in sample 1523 1523 1523 636 636 636 
Total sample size 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 
R2 .14 .14 .14 .15 .15 .15 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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